Democracies and Autocracies Compete to Rule the Digital World

The digital domain is an unusual arena of international competition. Unlike traditional geopolitical commons such as the oceans or space, the digital world was not found but created—and largely by private actors in California such as universities, firms, and inventors. As a result, the United States and its tech companies have long been the most influential voices in the debate over how to regulate the digital space.

But the fascinating new book Digital Empires by Anu Bradford argues that two serious rivals to U.S. high-tech hegemony have arisen: China and Europe. Despite three divergent approaches to digital rulemaking, according to Bradford, the battle to command transnational digital space ultimately comes down to a now-familiar contest between democracies and autocracies.

Three “Digital Empires”

The United States’ leading—for now, at least—approach to digital governance is market led, based on its creative and open culture. The arrival of immigrant startup founders and an unmatched university system have supplied world-beating digital talent, while flexible bankruptcy laws and daring venture capitalists enable tech entrepreneurs to take bold risks unthinkable elsewhere. Together, this ecosystem has unlocked an innovation powerhouse, allowing U.S. Big Tech to dominate the digital space. These companies’ growth adds to the U.S. government’s strength in setting digital rules—what Bradford describes as the United States’ “private power.”

In China, by contrast, the state leads, directing the digital commanding heights in a way that increases Beijing’s power at home and abroad. China has developed a powerful and innovative alternative tech ecosystem, with national champions from TikTok to Huawei becoming established international players as well. China exports its authoritarian digital model abroad—contradicting Western admonitions that development requires openness and the state ceding control to markets—by providing 5G telecommunications networks and digital tools for repression like facial recognition software. In these ventures, Beijing flexes what Bradford describes as its “infrastructure power.”

The European Union (EU) offers a distinct approach, focused less on innovation and more on regulation. Charting a middle course between U.S. libertarianism and Chinese authoritarianism, the EU wields the law to try to steer technology toward a fairer, more democratic future. According to Bradford, Europe is a “regulatory power,” leveraging its administrative and market might to set standards that multinational corporations are compelled to follow. When firms simplify by offering one standard EU-compliant product, this spreads Brussels’ regulations beyond Europe. For example, when a website asks for permission to use cookies, this is to comply with EU digital privacy regulations—even if one accesses the page from America.

EU Weakness, U.S. Convergence

These three “digital empires” promote their companies, technologies, and rules abroad to shape the digital world in line with their values. But Bradford, an international lawyer and EU scholar, focuses on the battle to regulate technologies, rather than to develop the most successful ones. This trichotomy implicitly favors regulatory power over the private or infrastructure type, despite Europe falling behind China and America in producing major tech firms or new technologies.

That said, the EU is undeniably a key actor in digital regulation, and its model may be gaining traction in the United States. Power is increasingly shifting from tech producers to consumers—and the legislators and regulators they democratically empower. Bradford is correct that the freewheeling U.S. model is receding—U.S. consumer privacy concerns are moving Washington closer to the Brussels model, as Congress sours on Big Tech. But the book’s argument that America is losing a tech battle to both the EU and China is less convincing.

Who Will Win the Digital Cold War?

More persuasive is the possibility of a trilateral struggle merging into a two-way contest: China versus a nominally unified West. In this tech war between “techno-democracies and techno-autocracies,” China—although outnumbered—may have an edge. Its powerful state is a unitary force that successfully exports its digital model and develops leading tech players—and has largely unchecked power to implement regulations. Many onlookers in the Global South see a proven model that delivers stable political control alongside robust economic development.

Despite China’s ascendancy, it’s unclear whether it will ultimately triumph over the techno-democracies. China’s opaque political system makes it hard to assess China’s real trajectory over vital future technologies. While Chinese firms like Huawei succeed abroad, U.S. competitors still hold the high ground worldwide. And tomorrow’s market share is more consequential than today’s.

In other words, innovation is critical, and it is yet to be seen whether China’s top-down techno-autocracy can out-innovate Silicon Valley’s open and spontaneous techno-democratic incubator. Even in an increasingly multipolar digital world, the most important innovations are still birthed in Silicon Valley. And the attributes that made California and America the center of all things digital—openness to immigration, top-tier universities, and a creative, risk-tolerant culture—have yet to arrive in China.

And in international fora, the techno-democracies have effectively resisted Chinese attempts to assert greater state control over the digital space. China’s “cyber sovereignty” ideology—pursued though international organizations where China can rally like-minded techno-autocracies against Western tech dominance—has enjoyed few victories. The techno-democracies have often succeeded in locking these organizations out of the digital domain, in favor of a “multi-stakeholder” approach that, in practice, protects the privileged role of U.S. tech firms, specialized civil society organizations, and universities.

Bradford is understandably reluctant to predict which digital empire will prevail. But she concludes that dominance by a single model of digital regulation or a truce between the digital empires are both equally unlikely. Instead, she sees continuing conflict as the more likely state of affairs—a view I am inclined to agree with. The battle over digital regulation is likely to take a central role in the larger ideological contest between democracies and autocracies to define the 21st century geopolitical order. Like that twilight struggle, don’t expect a resolution anytime soon.

Kal Raustiala is the Promise Institute professor of comparative and international law at UCLA School of Law, professor at the UCLA International Institute, and director of the UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations.

Thumbnail credit: Apple Store in Shanghai, China (Flickr)