IGCC UC INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

WORKING PAPER NO. 5
AUGUST 2025

The Endurance and Erosion of Support for *Mano Dura*: Electoral Evidence from the War on Drugs in the Philippines

Enrico Antonio B. La Viña and Nico Ravanilla

Abstract

Why does public support for *mano dura* policies, once implemented, either sustain or erode? This study examines the Philippine war on drugs. Using municipal-level vote shares from the 2019 elections—three years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency—we measure support for *mano dura* by analyzing votes for senatorial candidates who backed or opposed the drug war. Pairing this data with municipal-level crime and violence reports from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) and police blotters, we construct a panel of candidate-municipality observations and employ fixed effects for candidates and municipalities to identify the effects of targeted crimes and state violence on public support. We find that increases in targeted crimes, particularly drug-related offenses, bolster public support for *mano dura*, while state violence, especially by police, erodes it. These findings reveal a fragile balance between public safety concerns and the costs of repressive governance.

Keywords: Elections, crime, repression, justice, law, public safety, state violence, human rights

Authors

Enrico Antonio B. La Viña
PhD Candidate, UC Davis
Email: eblavina@ucdavis.edu

Nico Ravanilla
Associate Professor, UC San Diego
Email: nravanilla@ucsd.edu

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Lauren E. Young, Juan F. Tellez, Gabriella R. Montinola, and the members of the UC Davis Contentious Politics Lab (CP Lab) for their invaluable feedback. This research was supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). Enrico Antonio was a 2023–24 Peace Scholar Fellow at USIP and a 2024–25 Dissertation Fellow at IGCC.

Suggested Citation

La Viña, Enrico Antonio B. and Nico Ravanilla. 2025. *The Endurance and Erosion of Support for Mano dura: Electoral Evidence from the War on Drugs in the Philippines*. IGCC Working Paper No 5. escholarship.org/uc/item/3644639k

Introduction

In many democracies around the world, state responses to crime and violence often shape the political fortunes of their leaders. Leaders who pursue aggressive, punitive policies—commonly referred to as *mano dura* or "iron fist" approaches—frequently garner widespread public support, despite the long-term risks these strategies may pose to the very societies they claim to protect (Muggah, 2019; Rosen and Cutrona, 2021; Bateson, 2012). From Mexico and El Salvador to Thailand and the Philippines, these approaches resonate with voters who are anxious for swift solutions, even when those solutions result in state violence and human rights abuses (García-Ponce et al., 2023; Ravanilla et al., 2021). Although these policies frequently fail to reduce crime and can weaken the rule of law, they continue to receive public support, raising a critical question: what sustains backing for such hardline measures, and when does that support begin to wane (Laterzo, 2024)?

Rodrigo Duterte's "war on drugs" in the Philippines is emblematic of this dynamic. Elected in 2016 with a promise to eradicate drug-related crime through any means necessary, Duterte's administration pursued a brutal and extralegal *mano dura* campaign that led to thousands of deaths at the hands of police and state-backed militias (Whaley, 2016; Evangelista, 2023). Despite widespread international condemnation, the drug war policy enjoyed robust domestic support (Kenny and Holmes, 2020). Voters endorsed Duterte's approach, as evidenced by his allies' success in the 2019 Senate elections and his daughter's subsequent election as vice president in 2022. However, as with many *mano dura* campaigns, support for the policy has fluctuated over time, with its intensity waning in Duterte's later years, and his successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., signaling a shift in priorities (Gregorio, 2023; Iglesias, 2023). This paper seeks to understand what drives this fluctuation in support. Once implemented, why do some *mano dura* policies retain popular backing while others see public approval erode? Despite the long-term ineffectiveness and potential dangers of these policies, leaders like Duterte and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil initially reap significant political benefits. However, as the promised reductions in crime fail to materialize, public enthusiasm often fades, and leaders must recalibrate their approach as they begin to encounter public opposition (Iglesias, 2023).

We propose that two key factors explain why public support for *mano dura* policies either persists or declines. First, the local crime environment—specifically the prevalence of crimes that the policy targets—can sustain support. When citizens face higher levels of targeted crimes, such as drug-related offenses, they may perceive *mano dura* as an effective response. Second, the degree and visibility of state-perpetrated violence, whether committed by police or state-backed militias, critically influence

public attitudes. As citizens become more exposed to extralegal violence associated with these policies, initial enthusiasm can shift to skepticism or opposition. This aspect of how public support erodes over time remains underexplored in existing research, which tends to focus more on why *mano dura* policies initially garner support rather than on the conditions that lead to a decline in public approval.

Our theory builds on prior research that highlights the importance of local circumstances in shaping support for *mano dura*. Scholars have demonstrated that perceptions of and exposure to crime drive support for punitive and extralegal measures to combat crime (Bateson, 2012; García-Ponce et al., 2023; Laterzo, 2024; Visconti, 2020). While we agree that local crime conditions play a pivotal role, we argue that current theories are incomplete. They often overlook two critical factors: (1) incidents of *mano dura*—that is, punitive and often extralegal violence against civilians—and (2) how public support varies depending on whether the crimes are targeted or not targeted by *mano dura* policies. These two factors—state-perpetrated violence and crime specificity—are inextricable, as the public's tolerance for *mano dura* policies likely depends not only on their exposure to the policy's violent enforcement but also on whether the policy is perceived as addressing the most salient threats. Analyzing these factors together enables us to understand how enforcement mechanisms and crime targeting jointly influence public support. Our paper empirically tests the impact of both factors on public support or opposition to *mano dura*.

To identify the effects of crime occurrence and incidents of extralegal violence on support for *mano dura* policy, we focus on subnational variation in both outcomes and independent variables across municipalities and cities. Our dependent variable—vote share for pro-*mano dura* senatorial candidates—is an effective proxy for public support for the drug war, as the 2019 Philippine Senate elections were widely regarded as a referendum on President Duterte's "war on drugs" (Teehankee and Kasuya, 2020). By analyzing how vote shares vary between pro- and anti-*mano dura* candidates at the municipal or city level, we capture granular shifts in voter preferences. One key advantage of analyzing these senatorial elections is that multiple candidates with differing stances on the drug war are elected at the national level, but their electoral returns are observed locally. This allows us to construct a cross-sectional panel of candidate-municipality observations, and employ fixed effects for candidates and municipalities to control for unobserved heterogeneity along these two dimensions. In addition, our fine-grained data allows us to estimate the effect of crime conditioning on state repression, and vice versa.

We show that public support for candidates aligned with *mano dura* policies is shaped by local crime conditions and the visibility of state violence. Our outcome measure—vote share for Duterte-backed senatorial candidates in the 2019 election—captures this support in a context where the election itself was widely seen as a referendum on Duterte's flagship drug war (as we explain further in the context section). Candidates allied with the president openly endorsed his tough-on-crime agenda, making their vote share a meaningful proxy for public backing of *mano dura*. We find that higher levels of targeted crimes, such as drug-related offenses and homicides, increased support for these candidates, while more nontargeted crimes like theft and assault reduced it. Crucially, we also find that voters favor strong action against crime but react negatively to visible abuse by state forces; areas with more police-perpetrated killings of drug suspects saw significant drops in votes for pro-*mano dura* candidates. Violence by militias—less directly tied to the state—had weaker and more mixed effects. Overall, these results suggest that voters reward hardline crime control when it addresses specific threats but withdraw support when the state crosses legal boundaries.

These findings highlight the mechanisms through which *mano dura* policies gain or lose public support. The salience of targeted crimes—such as drug-related offenses—plays a critical role in sustaining support, particularly in high-crime areas where voters see harsh, extralegal responses as necessary to restore order. However, when nontargeted crimes are more salient, public confidence in the effectiveness of *mano dura* policy declines. Additionally, the visibility and attribution of violence are crucial; while voters may initially tolerate state-perpetrated violence, especially by the police, repeated incidents of brutality erode public trust. This erosion of support occurs as citizens confront the visible and often indiscriminate nature of the violence, which can trigger moral unease and disillusionment—even among those who initially supported harsh measures as necessary for public safety. By contrast, militia violence—being less directly associated with the state—provokes less backlash even if it is done on behalf of the state.

We performed multiple robustness checks to strengthen the validity of our findings. To address concerns that voter support for *mano dura* might differ based on how violent crimes are, we examined the effects of both violent and nonviolent crimes, finding that support does not significantly vary by this distinction but rather by whether crimes are targeted by the drug war. We expanded our analysis to include additional senatorial candidates beyond the top 24 vote getters, tested *mano dura* support by coding candidates who explicitly endorsed the war on drugs, and incorporated economic controls such as poverty rates, rural-urban classification, and average educational attainment to ensure our results are not influenced by unaccounted socioeconomic factors. Our results remained consistent across these tests.

Our study contributes to the literature on crime policy preferences, particularly in understanding why public support for punitive policies may initially surge but then erode over time. By focusing on both local crime conditions and the role of state-perpetrated violence, we provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics that drive public attitudes toward *mano dura* in the Philippines and other contexts. Similar to campaigns led by populist leaders like Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, the initial public enthusiasm for *mano dura* policies can eventually give way to disillusionment as the realities of extralegal violence and inefficacy become apparent (Iglesias, 2023). In doing so, this research contributes to a growing understanding of the dynamics of punitive crime policies in contexts where the rule of law is weak, and extralegal measures are used as political tools. The case of the Philippines offers critical insights into the conditions that sustain or erode public support for such policies, with broader implications for other developing democracies like Mexico and El Salvador.

Theory

Explanations for public support of *mano dura* policies generally focus on either ideological preferences or local circumstances. Ideologically, research has shown that left-wing individuals are more likely to oppose *mano dura*, while right-wing individuals tend to support it (Cohen and Smith, 2016; Gerber, 2021; Laterzo, 2024). However, this explanation is limited to contexts with strong programmatic parties and a clear ideological spectrum, which may not apply in countries with weakly institutionalized party systems, where voters are more influenced by nonideological factors like access to patronage (Hicken, 2011). In contrast, the "local circumstances" approach focuses on how exposure to crime and perceptions of crime shape public attitudes toward crime policy. This approach applies to both programmatic and nonprogrammatic contexts, making it more versatile. Our paper builds on the "local circumstances" framework by testing a theory that differentiates between the impact of targeted versus nontargeted crimes, as well as the effect of local exposure to *mano dura* incidents. We evaluate this theory by assessing the impact of different types of crimes and *mano dura* on the vote share of Duterte-backed Senate candidates in an election that was widely understood to be a referendum on the government's war on drugs.

Studies that emphasize local circumstances in shaping support for *mano dura* typically examine the effects of crime exposure or victimization. These studies find that exposure to crime or victimization tends to increase support for *mano dura* policies and candidates (Bateson, 2012; García-Ponce et al., 2023; Laterzo, 2024; Visconti, 2020). Psychological mechanisms, such as anger and a desire for vengeance, often mediate this relationship, leading individuals to favor punitive policies (García-Ponce et al., 2023). Others suggest that victimization leads to greater tolerance of policies that infringe on human rights, as long as they are perceived as effective (Visconti, 2020). While there is

consensus that crime exposure generally increases support for *mano dura*, the local circumstances approach has two key limitations. First, it overlooks the potential impact of *mano dura* incidents themselves on public support. Little research has examined how the actual implementation of these policies affects attitudes toward them. Second, existing studies do not account for the public's ability to differentiate between crimes targeted by *mano dura* and those that are not.

Our study aims to address both of these gaps.

The Effect of Exposure to *Mano Dura* on Support for *Mano Dura*

One key limitation of explanations for support of *mano dura* policies that emphasize crime exposure or victimization is their failure to account for the effects of *mano dura* incidents themselves. This omission is significant because voters may also be exposed to the actual implementation of *mano dura*, and it is essential to assess the electoral consequences of this exposure. While existing theories explain initial public support for *mano dura*, they often overlook how this support evolves once the policy is implemented and its costs become apparent. For instance, we have little understanding of how public support shifts when civilians—whether they are criminal suspects or not—are killed by the police or state-backed militias. Our first set of hypotheses, therefore, proposes that local increases in *mano dura* incidents perpetrated by the police will decrease support for the policy, while violence carried out by militias will have either a null, negative, or positive effect.

This paper examines a specific manifestation of *mano dura*: violence by the police and militias against suspected criminals who are not in police custody. These incidents involve suspects being killed either during official police operations or by unidentified assailants who can be linked to pro-government militias due to their informal but strong ties with the state.

We focus on these acts because they are not hidden, like cases of torture or disappearances. Even if the act itself is not fully visible, its aftermath often is; bystanders might witness the police barricades, see the bodies, or hear accounts from those familiar with the victims. In the Philippines, for instance, alleged drug suspects are often found wrapped in plastic with signs that read, "don't imitate me, I'm a drug pusher" (Wee and Elemia, 2024). These acts serve a dual purpose; they supposedly deter criminals while reassuring "law abiding" citizens that the government is taking a tough stance on crime. The public nature of this violence provides an opportunity to examine whether such acts reinforce support for *mano dura* policies or provoke backlash.

Our argument about the differing effects of *mano dura* violence by police versus militias is based on two assumptions: (1) local increases in *mano dura* violence reduce support for the policy, and (2) whether these violent incidents are attributed to the state's *mano dura* depends on the identity of the perpetrator. Even though people may initially support state repression, exposure to its consequences can lead to opposition. For instance, De Juan et al. (2023) found that witnessing Nazi atrocities created psychological dissonance among German civilians, causing a reduction in support for the regime. We believe a similar dynamic occurs with *mano dura*; while people may initially demand punitive measures, they may oppose the policy after witnessing its brutal outcomes, such as the killing of suspects in broad daylight. Thus, we hypothesize that an increase in police violence will decrease support for *mano dura*.

> **Hypothesis 1.1**: A local increase in *mano dura* violence by the police will decrease local support for *mano dura*.

This expectation rests on the idea that initial public support for *mano dura* stems from fear and a desire for control in the face of rising crime. However, as violence becomes more visible, indiscriminate, or directly witnessed, citizens may begin to experience psychological dissonance. Drawing from De Juan et al.'s (2023) study of the political effects of Nazi death marches on bystanders, even individuals who initially accepted or tolerated repressive measures shifted their attitudes once they personally encountered their consequences. In this context, repeated exposure to police killings—especially when the victims are perceived as undeserving or when the violence spills into everyday public life—can similarly provoke disillusionment and reduce public backing for punitive policies.

In contrast, killings carried out by pro-government militias may have a different effect than those perpetrated by the police. This difference hinges on whether the public attributes these nonstate incidents to the government or not. States often outsource repression and political violence to nonstate actors, such as pro-government militias, to create a layer of plausible deniability (Carey and Mitchell, 2017; Carey et al., 2015; Eck, 2015; Koren, 2017). Because the relationship between the state and these groups is often opaque and informal, the atrocities committed by militias may not be directly attributed to the government, even when there are rumors, evidence, or a public consensus about their connection. Thus, this set of hypotheses serves as a useful comparison to assess whether a decrease in support for *mano dura* is specifically driven by police-perpetrated violence or broader opposition to *mano dura* violence in general.

Governments may sometimes rely on death squads or loosely affiliated groups to enact violence against criminal suspects, as seen in the Philippines and El Salvador (Hume, 2007; Iglesias, 2023). When such violence is perpetrated by nonstate actors, it can create ambiguity about whether it reflects official policy. This ambiguity may allow

individuals to rationalize the violence according to their own biases, thus limiting the psychological conflict that could reduce support for *mano dura* (Bolsen and Palm, 2019; Kraft et al.,2015). Accordingly, if responsibility for violence is unclear, we hypothesize that militia-driven *mano dura* violence will have a neutral effect on public support, as people may not associate it with state policy.

> **Hypothesis 1.2.1**: A local increase in *mano dura* violence by militias will have a null effect on local support for *mano dura*.

In some contexts, however, the public may still view militias as extensions of the state, especially where there is widespread awareness of informal government ties to these groups (e.g., El Salvador, Mexico, and Brazil). In such cases, militia violence may indeed decrease support for *mano dura* if voters attribute it to state policy.

> **Hypothesis 1.2.2**: A local increase in *mano dura* violence by militias will decrease local support for *mano dura*.

Finally, militia violence may increase support for *mano dura* if voters view militias as vigilante groups acting on behalf of the community in the face of state incapacity. Such vigilante actions are sometimes supported, as in South Africa (Smith, 2019) and Mexico (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2017), where they are seen as filling a gap left by ineffective governance.

> **Hypothesis 1.2.3**: A local increase in *mano dura* violence by militias will increase local support for *mano dura*.

The effect of exposure to different types of crimes on support for *mano dura*
Our second set of hypotheses posits that local increases in crimes targeted by *mano dura* will lead to higher support for the policy, while increases in nontargeted crimes will reduce support. This hypothesis has two key dimensions: (1) why the public can distinguish between crimes targeted by *mano dura* and those that are not, and (2) why an increase in targeted crimes has a positive effect on support, while nontargeted crimes have the opposite effect.

The distinction between targeted and nontargeted crimes arises because *mano dura* policies prioritize addressing certain types of crimes over others. Not all crimes are seen as equal; the formulation, justification, and implementation of *mano dura* policies focus on specific crimes while disregarding others. Supporters of *mano dura* believe that punitive and extralegal measures are necessary due to the dangerous nature of the targeted crimes (García-Ponce et al., 2023). In fact, penal populists often highlight or exaggerate the threat of these crimes to rally public support for harsh measures (Curato, 2016). For example, in the Philippine “war on drugs,” President Duterte

justified the use of punitive and extralegal violence by framing drugs as an existential threat to the nation, claiming that extreme measures were the only solution to eradicate the problem (Evangelista, 2023; Kine, 2017). This framing elevates drug-related crimes—or any other crime targeted by *mano dura*—as graver threats than nontargeted crimes, thus legitimizing the use of *mano dura* measures. As a result, the public begins to perceive these crimes as distinct from others, contributing to the belief that they require a more severe response.

Accordingly, targeted and nontargeted crimes will have different effects on public support for *mano dura*. When it comes to targeted crimes, the public is not conditioned to expect fewer incidents; rather, they are led to anticipate their occurrence. *Mano dura* policies are often justified on the premise that these crimes are so dangerous and pervasive that only extreme measures can combat them (García-Ponce et al., 2023). Therefore, when targeted crimes occur, locals interpret this as confirmation of the crime's pervasive and dangerous nature, reinforcing their belief in the necessity of *mano dura* and bolstering their support for its continuation. For this reason, we hypothesize that increases in targeted crimes will lead to greater local support for *mano dura* policies.

> **Hypothesis 2.1**: A local increase in crimes targeted by *mano dura* will increase local support for *mano dura*.

The impact of nontargeted crimes may deviate from the standard prediction that increases in crime bolster support for *mano dura*. The public is likely to evaluate nontargeted crimes differently from those targeted by *mano dura*, as they do not perceive these crimes as posing the same level of danger or pervasiveness. If nontargeted crimes were considered equally threatening, they too would be subject to the same punitive, extralegal measures. Since they are not, people may view their occurrence as less severe, creating a distinct evaluative lens for nontargeted crimes. This distinction allows us to use nontargeted crimes as a placebo in our hypothesis on targeted crimes, providing a comparative baseline to better assess the unique impact of *mano dura* policies. By isolating the effects of nontargeted crimes, we can more accurately determine whether increased support for *mano dura* is driven by its focus on specific crimes or simply a broader reaction to rising crime rates.

Given the limited research on this topic, we do not have a strong prior expectation regarding the impact of nontargeted crimes. One possibility is that increases in nontargeted crimes, unlike targeted ones, will reduce support for *mano dura*. This could occur because rising nontargeted crime rates may lead people to view the *mano dura* approach as ineffective and overly narrow in its focus. As a result, they may become disillusioned with *mano dura*, believing that its high costs—including the resources required for its implementation and potential violations of laws and human rights—are

not justified by its limited effectiveness. Proponents argue that *mano dura*'s extremism is necessary to combat crime, but if nontargeted crimes rise, the public may begin to see the policy as shortsighted and ineffective. Therefore, it is possible that local increases in nontargeted crimes will decrease local support for *mano dura*.

> **Hypothesis 2.2.1**: A local increase in crimes not targeted by *mano dura* will decrease local support for *mano dura*.

Another possibility is that non-targeted crimes, like targeted ones, will increase support for *mano dura*. In this scenario, the public may perceive any rise in crime—regardless of its nature—as justifying a stronger and more aggressive response. Here, the distinction between targeted and nontargeted crimes becomes less relevant, as people may not differentiate between the types of crime. Instead, they may view all crime as a direct threat to their safety and security. The occurrence of nontargeted crimes can still provoke fear and a sense of vulnerability, leading to increased calls for harsh, extralegal measures. If the public perceives all crimes as part of a broader issue of lawlessness, they may view *mano dura* as a comprehensive solution to restore order and maintain safety. Under this reasoning, exposure to any crime could reinforce the belief that *mano dura* is necessary and effective, leading to heightened support for punitive policies, regardless of which types of crimes are explicitly targeted by the policy.

> **Hypothesis 2.2.2**: A local increase in crimes not targeted by *mano dura* will increase local support for *mano dura*.

Context

The War on Drugs in the Philippines

We test our theory by examining the impact of crime and *mano dura* incidents on voter support for pro-*mano dura* candidates in the 2019 Philippine Senate elections. Duterte's war on drugs provides an ideal case study for two key reasons. First, it exemplifies the *mano dura* or tough-on-crime approach seen in many democracies, especially in Latin America (Ravanilla et al., 2021; Regilme, 2021). Thus, our findings have broader applicability to other contexts where *mano dura* policies feature as major electoral issues. Second, the war on drugs represents a relatively new phenomenon in the Philippines. While human rights abuses by police were not unprecedented, the scale and explicit endorsement of state violence since Duterte's presidency is unparalleled (Kenny and Holmes, 2020; Kishi et al., 2018). This new policy environment allows us to assess the electoral consequences of *mano dura* policies in a setting where voters are encountering such measures for the first time.

In addition to testing broader support for *mano dura*, we examine the electoral impact of crimes specifically targeted by Duterte's drug war versus those not targeted. Drug-related crimes, murders, and homicides have been the primary focus of the "war on drugs," framed by Duterte and his allies as systemic threats to public safety requiring extreme measures (Kine, 2017; Evangelista, 2023). Duterte frequently emphasized that drug use and associated violence were existential threats to society, arguing that only aggressive, extralegal responses could effectively combat these issues (Arguelles, 2019; Curato, 2016; Tupas, 2018). Each instance of these targeted crimes was presented as evidence of the ongoing drug crisis, reinforcing public support for the necessity of *mano dura*. Consequently, voters likely interpreted occurrences of targeted crimes as validating the continuation of harsh anti-crime policies, boosting support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. On the other hand, nontargeted crimes, such as theft or vehicular offenses, which were not central to the government's rhetoric, may be seen as evidence of the policy's failure to address broader public safety concerns. Since these crimes were not prioritized in the *mano dura* agenda, their increase may lead voters to question the overall effectiveness of the drug war, potentially reducing support for candidates aligned with these policies (Osorio, 2015; Shirk and Wallman, 2015; Trejo and Ley, 2020; Vilalta, 2020).

The "war on drugs" began with Rodrigo Duterte's 2016 presidential campaign, which centered on the claim that poverty and corruption were rooted in the widespread use of illegal drugs. Duterte argued that the only way to "save" the country was to eliminate drug addicts, dealers, and the "elites" who protected them (Evangelista, 2023; Whaley, 2016). Once in power, Duterte gave police officers carte blanche to take extreme measures against drug suspects: "my order is shoot to kill you. I don't care about human rights, you better believe me" (Pitman, 2016). In addition to police actions, unidentified assailants played a key role in executing thousands of individuals labeled as "drug personalities," often leaving bodies with warnings such as "don't follow me, I am a pusher." While the exact affiliations of these hitmen remain unclear, their actions have been endorsed by Duterte, and there is substantial evidence of their coordination with the police (Kine, 2017; Lamb, 2016). Estimates of fatalities from the drug war range from the government's official count of 6,229 deaths as of March 2022, to over 20,000 by February 2018 (Elemia, 2018; Felipe, 2018; Gita-Carlos, 2022). Despite international condemnation and a preliminary investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC), the drug war remained popular throughout Duterte's term (Reuters, 2018; Gutierrez, 2019).

Our analysis focuses on the electoral impact of (1) violence by the police and militias against supposed criminal suspects and (2) targeted versus nontargeted crimes. In the Philippines, drug-related crimes and murders and homicides were the primary focus of the war on drugs. Duterte and his allies consistently framed these crimes as pervasive threats, justifying extreme, punitive measures (Kine, 2017). For the 2019 elections,

Duterte's allies campaigned on the premise that the drug threat persisted, necessitating continued aggressive action (Tupas, 2018). Therefore, each additional incident of drug-related crimes reinforced Duterte's narrative that the war on drugs needed to continue.

Similarly, the war on drugs was also framed as a means of combating murder and homicide. Duterte often portrayed drug users as violent threats to public safety, and supporters of the drug war emphasized the need to protect society from this violence (Arguelles, 2019; Cornelio and Medina, 2019; Curato, 2016; Evangelista, 2023). In other contexts, such as Mexico, drug-related violence is closely linked to the drug trade, further reinforcing the belief that combating drugs is essential to curbing violence (Osorio, 2015; Shirk and Wallman, 2015; Trejo and Ley, 2020; Vilalta, 2020). Therefore, we argue that drug-related crimes, murders, and homicides were key targets of the "war on drugs." Each additional incident of these crimes likely bolstered support for pro-*mano dura* candidates, while other crimes, not prioritized in the drug war, likely had a negative effect on voter support.

The 2019 Senate Elections

The Philippines employs a unique senatorial election system where candidates are elected at large, meaning voters across the entire country choose from the same pool of candidates. This differs from district-based legislative elections, as senators are elected nationally rather than by specific constituencies. The Senate consists of 24 members, half of whom are elected every three years for six-year terms, with a two-term limit. In each election, voters select up to 12 candidates from a national list, and the top 12 vote getters are elected.

Because of this national scope, senators tend to focus on broad, countrywide issues, relying on personal popularity and political alliances rather than localized patronage, which is more typical in the House of Representatives and other local races. This setup allows voters to focus on issues with national relevance, making senatorial elections a reflection of public opinion on major policies.

The 2019 senatorial election was widely seen as a referendum on President Duterte's war on drugs (Galvez, 2019; Agence France-Presse, 2019). Candidates aligned with Duterte supported the continuation of his *mano dura* approach, while opposition candidates criticized the policy's human rights abuses. This national election provided an opportunity to gauge public sentiment on the drug war and to assess how local crime conditions influenced voter preferences for pro- or anti-drug war candidates at the municipal level.

There are several reasons why electoral support for Duterte-aligned candidates in the 2019 elections serves as a strong proxy for public support for the administration's drug war. First, the election functioned as a direct referendum, where candidates either pledged to continue the drug war or vowed to end it. After three years of implementation, the candidates were able to clearly position themselves on this issue. Second, the Senate has significant power to shape or obstruct policies like the drug war through investigations and legislation. Third, the national election format, with all candidates on the ballot for all precincts, allows for a granular analysis of voter preferences at the local level, making it possible to correlate local crime conditions with electoral outcomes. Finally, comprehensive crime data from the start of Duterte's war on drugs in 2016 to the 2019 midterm elections enables us to directly test how crime trends relate to voter support for *mano dura* policies.

Research Design

We employ a combination of local crime, *mano dura*, and electoral data from the Philippines to examine the relationship between crime exposure, extralegal violence, and support for pro-*mano dura* candidates in the 2019 Philippine senatorial elections. Our analysis focuses on the vote shares of senatorial candidates across municipalities and cities, identifying how different types of crimes and incidents of state or nonstate violence influence voter behavior. The unit of analysis is the electoral performance of each senatorial candidate within a specific municipality or city, and our empirical approach uses a fixed effects model to account for variation in candidate and municipality or city-level characteristics.

Data

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is the vote share of senatorial candidates at the city or municipality level in the 2019 elections. Specifically, we use the vote share of candidates running under Duterte's Hugpong ng Pagbabago (HNP) slate as a measure of support for *mano dura* policies. In the Philippine context, slate alignment is a salient and widely understood signal of political loyalty, particularly regarding the war on drugs. The 2019 election was broadly seen as a referendum on Duterte's anti-drug campaign, and voting for HNP candidates was interpreted as support for its continuation (Galvez, 2019; Agence France-Presse, 2019). We also tested an alternative measure of *mano dura* support wherein we examined the vote share of candidates who explicitly endorsed the war on drugs irrespective of their membership in HNP in Table A.4.

We calculate the vote share by dividing the total number of votes a candidate received in each locality by the total number of valid ballots cast in that locality. The analysis focuses on the top 24 candidates, who represent the most competitive contenders in an

election with 62 candidates, as this approach avoids the statistical noise generated by less-known candidates. By focusing our dataset on the top 24 candidates, we capture more robust electoral patterns and reduce the noise introduced by candidates with marginal vote totals. This approach ensures that our findings are driven by competitive contenders, allowing for a clearer analysis of voter behavior across municipalities. Overall, our data includes 1,611 municipalities and cities, along with three metropolitan districts, creating a dataset with 38,736 observations (24 candidates multiplied by 1,614 localities).

Figure 1 provides a visual comparison of vote shares across different localities for candidates from Duterte's HNP slate, who endorsed the war on drugs, and those from the opposition Otso Diretso slate.

Figure 1: Combined Vote Share of HNP and Otso Diretso Candidates Across Localities

(a) Vote Share of Hugpong ng Pagbabago (HNP) Candidates



(b) Vote Share of Otso Diretso Candidates



Independent Variables

Our primary independent variables include measures of *mano dura* incidents, local crime rates, and candidate support for the *mano dura* policy.

***Mano Dura* Incidents:** We measure incidents of police and pro-government militia violence using data from ACLED. ACLED documents drug-related killings, identifying instances in which police or unidentified assailants, likely linked to militias, executed suspected drug offenders. In our analysis, we treat these unidentified assailants—coded by ACLED as "anti-drug vigilantes"—as pro-government militia members. This coding decision is based on extensive documentation from human rights organizations, journalists, and even the Philippine House of Representatives, all of which point to the existence of state-linked death squads operating under the guise of anonymous gunmen during the drug war (Beech, 2025; Evangelista, 2023; Kine, 2017; Lamb, 2016). For example, one gunman, Edgar Matobato—under the protection of the ICC as of 2025 for his potential role as a witness—testified, "for almost 24 years, I killed for Duterte." In light of this evidence that unidentified, anti-drug vigilantes are essentially pro-government militia members, for each locality, we aggregate the total number of fatalities caused by both the police and militias, normalize these figures by the number

of registered voters, and present the data as per capita rates. Figures 2 and 3 below depict the per capita distribution of *mano dura* incidents by state and nonstate actors.

Local Crime Rates: Our second key independent variable is the local crime rate, which we collected and analyzed for all municipalities and cities in the Philippines. The crime data was sourced from the Philippine National Police's (PNP) *Bantay Krimen* dataset of police blotter reports, which provides real-time updates of criminal incidents as they are reported by the public to local police stations. This comprehensive dataset, published online by the PNP and organized by provincial police offices, includes incidents dating back to late 2015, six months prior to President Duterte's election. For the purposes of this study, we use data covering the period from May 2016 to the May 2019 senatorial elections.

Figure 2: Per Capita Number of Police Mano dura Across Cities and Municipalities



The *Bantay Krimen* data set tracks seven categories of crimes: (1) drug-related crimes, (2) murders, (3) homicides, (4) rapes, (5) thefts, (6) assaults, and (7) vehicular thefts. Following guidelines set forth in the PNP's *Revised Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations and Investigation* (2014), drug-related incidents are further classified into subcategories, including buy-bust operations, warrant-based searches and seizures, marijuana eradication, financial investigations, clandestine laboratories, and other anti-drug operations.

In previous research, drug-related incidents recorded in the *Bantay Krimen* database have been used as a proxy for measuring the extent of Duterte's drug war implementation (Ravanilla et al., 2021). While this might indeed be the case, we clarify that the *Bantay Krimen* data primarily represents crime reports made by the public. Therefore, although the correlation between drug-related incidents and drug war implementation is likely strong, the data should be foremost understood as a measure of local crime rates, capturing public reporting of crime rather than solely police enforcement activity.

Figure 3: Per Capita Number of Militia *Mano Dura* Across Cities and Municipalities



In line with our theoretical framework, we make a critical distinction between crimes targeted by the war on drugs—specifically, drug-related crimes and murder or homicide—and those not explicitly targeted by *mano dura* policies, such as rape, theft, assault, and vehicular theft. The classification of these crimes is grounded in how they are officially reported in police blotters.

To account for population size and ensure accurate comparisons across municipalities, we calculated the per capita crime rate for each locality by summing the total number of incidents for each crime type, dividing by the number of registered voters, and multiplying by 1,000. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the distribution of both targeted and nontargeted crimes across cities and municipalities, showcasing the geographic variation in crime rates during the period leading up to the 2019 elections.
By using the *Bantay Krimen* dataset, we capture localized crime trends and analyze their electoral effects. This approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between crime rates and voter behavior in Duterte's anti-drug campaign, while recognizing that crime reporting—though correlated with police enforcement—is ultimately a measure of public crime experiences rather than just state activity.

Figure 4: Per Capita Number of Targeted Crimes Across Cities and Municipalities



Candidate Support for *Mano Dura*: Our third independent variable is the senatorial candidate's position on continuing the *mano dura* policy, specifically the war on drugs initiated by President Duterte. Candidates were classified as either (1) openly supporting the war on drugs or (2) opposing or remaining agnostic about the policy. This classification is based on their alignment with the administration's senatorial slate, HNP.

Figure 5: Per Capita Number of Nontargeted Crimes Across Cities and Municipalities



Candidates who ran as part of the HNP slate are categorized as supporters of *mano dura* and coded with a value of 1. The degree of their support varied—while some candidates, such as Ronald "Bato" dela Rosa, a former chief of the PNP and a prominent figure in the drug war, were enthusiastic proponents, others like Cynthia Villar were more reserved in their public endorsements. Nevertheless, being part of Duterte's senatorial slate signified a clear alignment with his administration and its drug war policies, especially since the 2019 elections were widely regarded as a referendum on the war on drugs.

Candidates who did not run with the HNP slate are classified as nonsupporters or those not openly advocating for *mano dura* policies. These candidates were coded with a value of 0. By distinguishing between these two groups, we can capture the electoral impact of a candidate's stance on the drug war and explore how this positioning influences voter support across municipalities.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 provides a summary of the key variables used in our analysis, including their means, standard errors, and percentile values. The vote share of senatorial candidates, which serves as our dependent variable, shows considerable variation across cities and municipalities, with a mean of 0.25 and a standard error of 0.00079. This indicates that, on average, candidates received around 25 percent of the vote, with only slight differences across localities.

In terms of the independent variables, targeted crimes—such as drug-related crimes and murder or homicide—has a mean of 1.79 per 1000 capita, with relatively small variation across municipalities and cities (standard error of 0.0076). Nontargeted crimes, which include offenses like theft and vehicular theft, occur at a higher rate, with a mean of 3.51 per 1000 capita and a standard error of 0.021. Similarly, *mano dura* incidents perpetrated by the police and militias have means of 0.026 and 0.017 per 1000 capita and standard errors of 0.0037 and 0.00021, respectively.

The descriptive statistics confirm that there is variation in the occurrence of both targeted and nontargeted crimes across municipalities, as well as differences in the rates of police and militia *mano dura* incidents. This variation provides a strong basis for examining how these factors influence voter support for pro-*mano dura* candidates in our subsequent analyses.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables

	Descriptive Statistics				
Variable	Mean	Standard Error	25th Percentile	50th Percentile	75th Percentile
Vote Share	0.25	0.00079	0.11	0.23	0.35
Targeted Crimes per 1,000	1.79	0.0076	0.93	1.46	2.29
Nontargeted Crimes per 1,000	3.51	0.021	1.33	2.32	4.27
Police *Mano Dura* per 1,000	0.026	0.00037	0.00	0.00	0.024
Militia *Mano Dura* per 1,000	0.017	0.00021	0.00	0.00	0.00
Administration Candidate	0.54	0.0025	0.00	1.00	1.00
Sample Size: 38,736					

The variation of independent and dependent variables is made further apparent when we examine its distribution on a regional level (See Table A.1 in the SI). Some regions have relatively low levels of police and militia *mano dura*—Bangsamoro and Region V, for example—while regions like the National Capital Region have higher levels. Similarly, areas like Region IV-A have relatively high levels of targeted crimes but low levels of nontargeted, while it is the opposite for Region VI. Finally, there is a fair amount of regional variation in terms of support for administration candidates.

Econometric Specification

To formally test our hypotheses, we stack candidate-level data to form a panel dataset with candidate-municipality or city observations. With this dataset, we employ a fixed effects estimation strategy as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} VoteShare_{jk} = \alpha &+ \beta_1(TargetCrimes_k \times AdminCandidate_j) + \\ &\beta_2(NontargetCrimes_k \times AdminCandidate_j) + \\ &\beta_3(PoliceManoDura_k \times AdminCandidate_j) + \\ &\beta_4(MilitiaManoDura_k \times AdminCandidate_j) + \\ &\gamma_1 TargetCrimes_k + \gamma_2 NontargetCrimes_k + \\ &\gamma_3 PoliceManoDura_k + \gamma_4 MilitiaManoDura_k + \\ &\gamma_5 AdminCandidate_j + \delta_j + \phi_k + \epsilon_{jk} \end{aligned}$$

Where $VoteShare_{jk}$ is the vote share of senatorial candidate j in municipality or city k in 2019. $TargetCrimes_k$ represents the number of crimes targeted by the war on drugs (such as drug-related crimes and murders or homicides), and $NontargetCrimes_k$ represents nontargeted crimes (such as theft or vehicular offenses) in a municipality or city k. $PoliceManoDura_k$ and $MilitiaManoDura_k$ represent *mano dura* incidents committed by the police and militias, respectively. $AdminCandidate_j$ is a binary indicator for whether candidate j is aligned with the administration and supports the *mano dura* policy.

We interact each crime and *mano dura* variable with $AdminCandidate_j$ to assess whether their effect on vote share differs for pro-*mano dura* candidates. Candidate fixed effects δ_j control for differences between candidates, such as individual popularity or platform appeal, while municipality or city fixed effects ϕ_k account for time-invariant characteristics of localities that might influence voting, such as political culture or historical preferences. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality or city level to account for potential autocorrelation within municipalities.

Results

The Impact of *Mano Dura* Incidents on the Vote Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

Our first set of hypotheses examines how *mano dura* incidents carried out by police or pro-government militias influence support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. These incidents involve the killing of alleged drug suspects by either state forces or militias. Table 2 presents the regression results for the impact of various crimes—both targeted and nontargeted—and *mano dura* incidents—committed by police and militias—on the vote share of pro-*mano dura* candidates.

The first four columns test the individual interactions between different types of crimes or *mano dura* incidents and support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. Column 1 evaluates the impact of police-perpetrated *mano dura* incidents, and Column 2 examines militia-perpetrated incidents. Column 3 focuses on the interaction between targeted crimes and the vote share of pro-*mano dura* candidates, while Column 4 tests the effect of nontargeted crimes. Each column isolates the effect of these interactions on the vote share, allowing us to understand how individual factors influence electoral outcomes.

Column 5 provides the most comprehensive model, which includes all variables to assess the combined impact. In this model, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1.1, which predicted that an increase in police-perpetrated *mano dura* incidents would decrease local support for *mano dura*. The coefficient of -0.091 suggests that for each additional police-perpetrated fatality per 1,000 people, there is a 9.1 percent decrease in the vote share for pro-*mano dura* candidates. This indicates that voters in localities with higher police killings tend to punish candidates who support *mano dura* policies, aligning with the notion that exposure to state violence triggers dissonance, leading voters to oppose such policies.

In contrast, Hypothesis 1.2.1, which predicted that militia-perpetrated killings would have a null effect on support for *mano dura*, finds partial support in our results. Column 2 shows that the coefficient for militia-perpetrated fatalities is positive but statistically insignificant, indicating that these incidents do not significantly impact the vote share for pro-*mano dura* candidates. This result suggests that voters may not directly associate militia violence with the state or the *mano dura* policy, as predicted by the hypothesis.

Lastly, Hypothesis 1.2.2 posited that militia-perpetrated killings might decrease support for *mano dura* if voters attribute these killings to the state. However, our results show no significant negative effect of militia killings on pro-*mano dura* candidates' vote share, which indicates that the public may not clearly link these nonstate actors to the

government or its policy. This suggests that, in line with Hypothesis 1.2.1, militia-perpetrated violence is less likely to influence voter attitudes in comparison to police-perpetrated violence.

We also found support for our prediction that the impact of drug-related killings by pro-government militias on voter share will be statistically insignificant. In model 5 of Table 1, the occurrence of *mano dura* violence by militias has a coefficient of 0.032 with clustered standard errors of 0.038. This aligns with hypothesis that nonstate drug-related violence will have a null effect on voter support for *mano dura* policies. The weaker level of significance suggests that voters may have mixed reactions to nonstate *mano dura* activities, possibly viewing them with uncertainty or ambivalence compared to state-sanctioned actions.

Our second set of hypotheses explores how different types of crimes—those targeted by *mano dura* and those not targeted—affect voter support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. Hypothesis 2.1 predicted that a local increase in crimes targeted by *mano dura* would lead to an increase in support for the policy, while Hypotheses 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 proposed that nontargeted crimes could either decrease or increase support, depending on whether voters perceive them as relevant to the *mano dura* approach.

In Column 5 of Table 2, we find evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2.1, which states that an increase in targeted crimes would boost local support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. Specifically, the coefficient for the interaction between targeted crimes and the candidate's support for *mano dura* is 0.007, indicating that for every additional incident of a targeted crime (such as drug-related offenses or homicides) per 1,000 people, there is a 0.7 percent increase in the vote share for pro-*mano dura* candidates. This implies that when voters in a locality perceive an uptick in crimes that the drug war seeks to address, they tend to view pro-*mano dura* candidates more favorably, as expected.

Regarding nontargeted crimes, we find support for Hypothesis 2.2.1, which predicted that increases in crimes not targeted by the drug war would lead to less support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. The coefficient for the interaction between nontargeted crimes and the *mano dura* stance of candidates is -0.002, which indicates that each additional incident of a non-targeted crime (such as theft, assault, or vehicular theft) per 1,000 people results in a 0.2 percent decrease in vote share for pro-*mano dura* candidates. This suggests that voters perceive these crimes as being outside the focus of *mano dura* policies and may view the policy as ineffective when such crimes rise, leading to reduced support for candidates aligned with the policy.

Table 2: Electoral Effects of Targeted and Nontargeted Crimes, Police and Militia *Mano Dura* on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.039**				-0.091***
	(0.018)				(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000		0.029			0.032
		(0.034)			(0.038)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000			0.005***		0.007***
			(0.002)		(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000					-0.002**
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Municipality/City Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Candidate Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	38,736	38,736	38,736	38,736	38,736
Adjusted R^2	0.644	0.644	0.644	0.644	0.645

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

We did not find evidence for Hypothesis 2.2.2, which posited that nontargeted crimes could potentially increase support for *mano dura* if voters view all crime as part of a broader lawlessness that justifies tough measures. Instead, the results clearly show that nontargeted crimes tend to undermine support for pro-*mano dura* candidates, reinforcing the notion that voters distinguish between different types of crimes and base their electoral preferences accordingly.

Figure 6 presents a coefficient plot showing the electoral impact of the seven distinct crimes tracked in the *Bantay Krimen* dataset. By disaggregating these crimes, we can assess the specific effects of targeted crimes—such as drug-related offenses and murder or homicide—and nontargeted crimes, including rape, assault, theft, and vehicular theft. The results reveal some differences from the aggregate analysis. While targeted crimes tend to have a positive effect on support for *mano dura* policies, only murder or homicide has a statistically significant impact, whereas drug-related crimes show no significant effect.

Among the nontargeted crimes, we observe that rape, theft, and assault exert negative effects on support for *mano dura*, with the impact of assault being statistically significant. This reinforces the idea that nontargeted crimes tend to reduce support for these tough-on-crime policies. Interestingly, the effect of rape appears highly variable, suggesting that its impact on voter support for *mano dura* can go in either direction. Unexpectedly, vehicular theft and robbery exhibit positive effects, with vehicular theft showing a significant positive impact. One possible explanation is that voters associate these crimes with organized criminal syndicates, which in the Philippines are often involved in activities such as drug trafficking and car theft (commonly known as "carnapping") (Frialde, 2014). As a result, voters may perceive these crimes as part of a broader organized crime problem that requires a strong authoritarian response from the state. Overall, the coefficient plot provides partial support for the hypothesis that targeted crimes increase support for the war on drugs, though the effects are more nuanced across different crime types.

Robustness Checks

Violent vs. Nonviolent Crime Effects on *Mano Dura* Support. One potential concern with our analysis is that voter support for *mano dura* may vary depending on whether the crimes in question are violent or nonviolent. In Table 3, we examine the impact of violent crimes—such as assault, rape, robbery, and murder or homicide—and nonviolent crimes—such as drug-related offenses, theft, and vehicular theft—on electoral support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. The results indicate that both violent and nonviolent crimes have an insignificant effect on support for *mano dura*. This suggests that the critical factor driving voter behavior is not necessarily whether the crime is violent or nonviolent, but rather whether the crime is targeted by *mano dura* policies. Thus, while crime type matters, the distinction between targeted and nontargeted crimes appears more relevant than the nature of the crime itself in influencing voter support.

Expanding the Candidate Pool for Robustness Checks. To further validate our findings, we expanded our analysis to include a broader set of candidates beyond the top 24 vote getters. We examined two additional datasets: one consisting of candidates who received over 1 million votes (Table A.2 in the Supporting Information (SI)), and another encompassing all 62 senatorial candidates, some of whom garnered only a few hundred thousand votes (Table A.3 in the SI). Including a wider range of candidates offers a more stringent test of our theory, as the lesser-known and less competitive candidates introduce greater variability, potentially adding statistical noise to the analysis.

Figure 6: Coefficient Plot of Crime Types and Pro-*Mano Dura* Vote Share



Table 3: Electoral Effects of Violent and Nonviolent Crimes on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share	
	(1)	(2)
Administration candidate x Violent crime per 1,000	-0.001	
	(0.001)	
Administration candidate x Non-violent crime per 1,000		0.0004
		(0.001)
Observations	38,736	38,736
Adjusted R^2	0.644	0.644

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

The results from Tables A.2 and A.3 largely corroborate the patterns found in our main analysis (Column 5 of Table 2). Although the statistical significance of nontargeted crimes, police *mano dura*, and militia *mano dura* shifts slightly across the expanded samples, the directional consistency of these effects reinforces our initial conclusions. Targeted crimes consistently exhibit a significant positive effect on pro-*mano dura* support across all datasets. For police *mano dura*, the significant negative impact remains robust in both the top 24 and the over 1 million-vote datasets but becomes less pronounced in the full sample, likely due to the greater variability introduced by lower-profile candidates. Similarly, the results for militia *mano dura* vary in significance, consistent with our expectation that its impact may be ambiguous or context dependent. These variations suggest that while the magnitude and significance of some effects fluctuate with the inclusion of less competitive candidates, the broader patterns of our findings remain intact, particularly for targeted crimes and state violence.

Testing Alternative Definitions of *Mano Dura* Support. To further test the robustness of our findings, we redefined our measure of *mano dura* support by considering whether candidates explicitly endorsed the war on drugs during the campaign, regardless of their official affiliation with Duterte's slate. Candidates who openly supported the policy at any point were coded as 1, while others were coded as 0. This alternative measure was tested on two samples: Column 1 of Table A.4 in the Supporting Information (SI) focuses on the top 24 candidates, while Column 2 includes candidates with over 1 million votes. The results were largely consistent across both samples. Specifically, police-perpetrated *mano dura* continued to show a significant negative effect, while militia-perpetrated violence remained insignificant. However, there were differences in the effect of crime types. Although targeted crimes exhibited a positive effect, this was not statistically significant, while nontargeted crimes had a significant negative impact, contradicting our expectation that they would be less consequential.

There are compelling reasons why our main measure—whether candidates ran with Duterte's administration slate—remains preferable to this alternative. The Philippines' political system is characterized by a multiparty, nonprogrammatic environment with frequent party switching, making it difficult to infer candidates' policy positions from their party affiliations alone (Hicken, 2014; Teehankee, 2020). In this context, candidates often rely more on personal appeal than programmatic stances, which means that publicly supporting the war on drugs may not feature prominently in their campaign messaging. In fact, our coding process revealed that many candidates, even those who expressed support, gave little attention to this issue during their campaigns. Given this, running under Duterte's slate remains a clearer and more consistent signal of support for the war on drugs.

Aggregating Vote Shares to Test for Clustered Standard Error Inflation. Additionally, to ensure that the clustered standard errors in our main model (Model 5, Table 2) were not

inflated, we aggregated the vote shares of all administration candidates within each locality. Table A.5 presents these results, analyzing aggregated vote shares across 1,614 localities, compared to the individual candidate-level analysis in our main model. The results align with our previous findings, indicating that standard errors were not biased downward. However, in this case, targeted crimes, while positively associated with pro-*mano dura* support, were not statistically significant.

"Leave One Out" Analysis to Test Candidate-Specific Influence. Furthermore, to assess whether our results were driven by any particular candidate, we conducted a "leave one out" analysis, excluding one candidate at a time from our dataset and reestimating the model (Tables A.6 to A.29). This approach helped identify whether the results were disproportionately influenced by individual candidates' performance. Across all 24 models, the findings were consistent; police-perpetrated *mano dura* incidents consistently had a significant negative effect, while targeted crimes had a significant positive effect, in line with our hypotheses. Militia-perpetrated violence remained largely insignificant, while nontargeted crimes were generally significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent level. These results bolster confidence in the robustness of our key findings.

Inclusion of Economic Factors in Analysis. Finally, in Table 4, we examine whether the observed effects of state and nonstate *mano dura* policies, as well as targeted and nontargeted crimes, on senatorial candidates' vote shares are influenced by key economic and demographic factors. Specifically, we control for variables such as poverty incidence, rurality, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) scaled by 1 million, and the percentage of residents with at least a high school education, each interacted with the pro-*mano dura* indicator (i.e., administration candidate). Each column in the regression table adds one of these controls sequentially: Column 1 includes only the *mano dura* and crime data alongside poverty incidence, Column 2 adds rurality, Column 3 includes the scaled IRA, and Column 4 accounts for high school graduation rates. Column 5 presents the full model with all controls, offering the most comprehensive specification.

Results across all columns consistently support our main hypotheses; police-perpetrated *mano dura* killings have a significant negative effect on pro-*mano dura* candidates' voter share, while targeted crimes show a significant positive effect. There is some evidence that nontargeted crimes have a slight negative impact on voter share for these candidates. Interestingly, militia-perpetrated *mano dura* exhibits a significant positive effect, diverging from most of our other models where its effect is generally null. Among the economic controls, only poverty incidence has a significant impact in the full model specification (Column 5). This suggests that economic hardship may amplify security concerns, potentially shaping voter preferences and underscoring the importance of considering both security and economic factors in electoral behavior analyses.

Table 4: Electoral Effects of State and Nonstate *Mano Dura*, Targeted and Nontargeted Crimes, and Various Controls on Voter Share of Senatorial Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Admin. cand. x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.080***	-0.088***	-0.122***	-0.082***	-0.110***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Admin. cand. x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.129***	0.043	0.064	0.080*	0.158***
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Admin. cand. x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.009***	0.008***	0.007***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Admin. cand. x Non-targeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Admin. cand. x Poverty incid.	0.001***				0.001***
	(0.0001)				(0.0003)
Admin. cand. x Rural		0.018**			0.008
		(0.008)			(0.009)
Admin. cand. x IRA (scaled)			0.00004		0.0001
			(0.00003)		(0.00003)
Admin. cand. x HS grads (%)				-0.069***	-0.009
				(0.019)	(0.036)
Mun./City Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cand. Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	38,640	38,640	30,192	38,640	30,192
Adjusted R^2	0.647	0.645	0.657	0.645	0.658

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Conclusion

Our study demonstrates that local crime conditions and incidents of state-perpetrated violence significantly shape voter support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find that crimes specifically targeted by the "war on drugs"—such as drug-related offenses and murder/homicide—have a clear positive effect on electoral support for pro-*mano dura* candidates. In contrast, we observe that police-perpetrated violence against suspected criminals generates a strong negative electoral response. In addition, the effect of violence perpetrated by militias, is unclear. Most of our models suggest that militias have a null effect on *mano dura* support. The inclusion of economic indicators in our model, however, suggests that militia *mano dura* has a significant-positive effect. Similarly, nontargeted crimes exhibit a complex pattern, where support for *mano dura* declines in response to some crimes, though this effect is more fragile and context dependent.

These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the limits and dynamics of public support for punitive policies like the drug war. While prior research has demonstrated that tough-on-crime policies tend to garner broad electoral support when crime levels are high, our study reveals that this relationship is far more nuanced. We show that voter reactions depend not only on the incidence of crime but also on whether these crimes are framed as existential threats that demand extraordinary state action. This distinction between targeted and nontargeted crimes is critical in explaining how public support for *mano dura* is sustained or diminished over time. Our findings highlight that voters are more likely to reward pro-*mano dura* candidates when they perceive the policy as effectively addressing the most dangerous crimes, while non-targeted crimes erode confidence in the efficacy of the policy.

Furthermore, our analysis of police-perpetrated violence underscores the potential electoral costs of employing heavy-handed enforcement measures. While Duterte's administration has largely justified extrajudicial killings as a necessary means of combating crime, our results suggest that such visible state violence may undermine public trust in the policy itself. The finding that police-enacted killings substantially reduce vote share for pro-*mano dura* candidates reinforces the idea that even among electorates supportive of punitive policies, there are clear limits to the tolerance of state repression. By contrast, our findings further reveal that while police-enacted killings consistently reduce support for pro-*mano dura* candidates, the effect of militia violence is more ambiguous—often null, though some models indicate a significant positive impact when economic factors are included. This indicates that the attribution of violence plays a key role in shaping public opinion.

This research contributes several important insights to the broader literature on crime, violence, and electoral behavior. First, it demonstrates that while *mano dura* policies can initially galvanize public support, the manner of their implementation—specifically, the use of overt state violence—can provoke electoral backlash. This finding is particularly relevant in democracies where the rule of law is often strained by the pressures of populism. Second, our analysis highlights the importance of disaggregating crime types when studying the electoral impact of law-and-order policies. Voters appear to distinguish between crimes that are central to the government's narrative and those that are not, responding differently based on their perceived salience.

Finally, our findings speak to the broader political implications of penal populism. While leaders like Duterte have successfully leveraged public anxiety over crime to maintain political power, our study suggests that the electoral calculus surrounding such policies is more tenuous than previously thought. Even in contexts where tough-on-crime rhetoric resonates deeply, there are significant risks associated with the sustained use of violence as a tool of governance. As public sentiment shifts in response to the visible costs of state repression, the very policies that once secured political victories may, over time, become liabilities.

References

Agence France-Presse. Philippines voters back Duterte and his drug war as he closes in on midterms victory, May 2019. URL https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/14/philippines-mid-term-elections-duterte-closes-in-on-victory-senate. Accessed 15 June 2025. 15, 17

Arguelles, Cleve V. "We are Rodrigo Duterte": Dimensions of the Philippine populist publics' vote. *Asian Politics Policy*, 11(3):417–437, 2019. 13, 15

Bateson, Regina. Crime victimization and political participation. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3):570–587, 2012. 1, 2, 6

Beech, Hannah. "Nobody will touch you": How a Filipino police officer became a drug-war hit man. *The New York Times*, January 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/05/world/asia/philippines-hit-man-confession.html. 20

Bolsen, Toby and Risa Palm. Motivated reasoning and political decision making. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press, 2019. 8

Carey, Sabine C. and Neil J. Mitchell. Progovernment militias. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20(1):127–147, 2017. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051215-023043. 8

Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell. Governments, informal links to militias, and accountability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59:850–876, 2015. 8

Cohen, Mollie J. and Amy Erica Smith. Do authoritarians vote for authoritarians? evidence from Latin America. *Research & Politics*, 3(4):20531, 2016. URL https://doi.org/10. 1177/2053168016684066. 5

Cornelio, Jayeel and Erron Medina. Christianity and Duterte's war on drugs in the Philippines. *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 20(2):151–169, 2019. doi: 10.1080/21567689.2019. 1617135. URL https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2019.1617135. 15

Curato, Nicole. Politics of anxiety, politics of hope: Penal populism and Duterte's rise to power. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 35(3):91–109, 2016. doi: 10.1177/186810341603500305. 10, 13, 15

De Juan, Alexander, Christian Gläßel, Felix Haas, and Adam Scharpf. The political effects of witnessing state atrocities: Evidence from the Nazi death marches. *Comparative Political Studies*, 0(0):1–36, 2023. 7

Eck, Kristine. Repression by proxy: How military purges and insurgency impact the delegation of coercion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(5):924–946, 2015. doi: 10.1177/0022002715576746. 8

Elemia, Camille. Trillanes calls on senate to defend De Lima, press freedom, right to life, February 21, 2018. URL https://www.rappler.com/nation/196573-trillanes-privilege-speech-de-lima-press-freedom-extrajudicial-killings/. Accessed by February 26, 2024. 14

Evangelista, Patricia. *Some People Need Killing: A Memoir of Murder in My Country*. Random House, New York, first edition, 2023. 1, 10, 13, 14, 15, 20

Felipe, Cecille Suerte. PNP bares numbers: 4,251 dead in drug war, May 8, 2018. URL https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/05/08/1813217/pnp-bares-numbers-4251-dead-drug-war. Accessed by February 24, 2024. 14

Frialde, Mike. Marlboro carjack gang leader falls in Taguig, July 2014. URL https://www.philstar.com/nation/2014/07/25/1350240/marlboro-carjack-gang-leader-falls-taguig. Accessed by September 9, 2024. 33

Galvez, Daphne. Locsin: Duterte drug war won in 2019 senatorial race. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 2019. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1119118/locsin-duterte-and-drug-war-won-in-2019-senatorial-race. 15, 17

García-Ponce, Omar, Lauren E. Young, and Thomas Zeitzoff. Anger and support for retribution in Mexico's drug war. *Journal of Peace Research*, 60(2):274–290, 2023. doi: 10.1177/00223433221075191. 1, 2, 6, 10

Gerber, Monica M. Attitudes toward punishment. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice*. Oxford University Press, 2021. URL https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.640. 5

Gita-Carlos, Ruth Abbey. Give drug war report to human rights groups, Duterte tells PDEA, March 30 2022. URL https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1170963. Accessed by February 28, 2024. 14

Gregorio, Xave. Marcos: "There were abuses" in Duterte's "drug war," May5, 2023. URL https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/05/05/2264043/marcos-there-were-abuses-dutertes-drug-war. Accessed April 11, 2024. 1

Gutierrez, Jason. Philippines officially leaves the International Criminal Court, March 17, 2019. URL https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/world/asia/philippines-international-criminal-court.html. Accessed by February 28, 2024. 14

Hicken, Allen. Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14:289–310, 2011. 5

Hicken, Allen. Party and party system institutionalization in the Philippines. In Hicken, Allen and Eric M. Kuhonta, editors, *Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past*, pages 307–327. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 36

Hume, Mo. Mano dura: El Salvador responds to gangs. *Development in Practice*, 17(6): 739–751, 2007. doi: 10.1080/09614520701628121. 8

Iglesias, Sol. Explaining the pattern of "war on drugs" violence in the Philippines under Duterte. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 15(2):164–184, 2023. 1, 2, 5, 8

Kenny, Paul D. and Ronald Holmes. A new penal populism? Rodrigo Duterte, public opinion, and the war on drugs in the Philippines. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 20(2):187–205, 2020. 1, 13

Kine, Phelim. The Philippines' Duterte incites vigilante violence, April 19, 2017. URL https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/19/philippines-duterte-incites-vigilante-violence. Accessed by February 27, 2024. 10, 13, 14, 20

Kishi, Roudabeh, Mel Pavlik, Rico La Vina, and Marian Constantino. Duterte's war: Drug-related violence in the Philippines. Armed Conflict Event Data Project, 2018. URL https://acleddata.com/2018/10/18/dutertes-war-drug-related-violence-in-the-philippines/. Accessed March 9, 2021. 13

Koren, Ore. Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 34(5):461–484, 2017. doi: 10.1177/ 0738894215600385. 8

Kraft, Patrick W., Milton Lodge, and Charles S. Taber. Why people "don't trust the evidence": Motivated reasoning and scientific beliefs. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 658(1):121–133, 2015. 8

Lamb, Kate. Philippines secret death squads: Officer claims police teams behind wave of killings, October 3 2016. URL https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/philippines-secret-death-squads-police-officer-teams-behind-killings. Accessed by February 28, 2024. 14, 20

Laterzo, Isabel G. Progressive ideology and support for punitive crime policy: Evidence from Argentina and Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies*, 57(6):999–1034, 2024. doi: 10.1177/00104140231193011. 1, 2, 5, 6

Muggah, Robert. Reviewing the costs and benefits of mano dura versus crime prevention in the Americas. In Timothy M. Shaw, Renu Modi Xu Yi-chong, Laura C. Mahrenbach, editors, *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2019. doi: 10.1057/978-1-137-45443-0 29. 1

Osorio, Javier. The contagion of drug violence: Spatiotemporal dynamics of the Mexican war on drugs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(8):1403–1432, 2015. 14, 15

Pitman, Todd. In Philippines drug war, a family struggles to stay safe, October 19, 2016. URL https://apnews.com/general-news-ba07d480a44941ed81ffbc997bf8322b. Accessed February 28, 2024. 14

Ravanilla, Nico, Renard Sexton, and Dotan Haim. Deadly populism: How local political outsiders drive Duterte's war on drugs in the Philippines. *The Journal of Politics*, 2021. doi: 10.1086/715257. May. 1, 13, 21

Regilme, Salvador Santino F. Visions of peace amidst a human rights crisis: War on drugs in Colombia and the Philippines. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 6(2), 2021. doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogaa022. 13

Reuters. Filipinos give thumbs up to Duterte's "excellent" drugs war—poll, September 2018. URL https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1W8039/. Accessed February 28, 2024. 14

Rosen, Jonathan D. and Sebastián Cutrona. Understanding support for mano dura strategies: Lessons from Brazil and Colombia. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 24:324–342, 2021. 1

Shirk, David and Joel Wallman. Understanding Mexico's drug violence. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(8):1348–1376, 2015. URL https://www.jstor.org/stable/24546346. 14, 15

Smith, Nicholas Rush. *Contradictions of Democracy: Vigilantism and Rights in Post Apartheid South Africa.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019. 9

Teehankee, Julio C. and Yuko Kasuya. The 2019 midterm elections in the Philippines: Party system pathologies and Duterte's populist mobilization. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 5(1):69–81, 2020. doi: 10.1177/2057891119896425. 3

Teehankee, Julio Cabral. Factional dynamics in Philippine party politics, 1900–2019. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 39(1):98–123, 2020. 36

Trejo, Guillermo and Sandra Ley. *Votes, drugs, and violence: The political logic of criminal wars in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, 2020. 14, 15

Tupas, Emmanuel. Ronald Dela Rosa: Death of police found guilty of murder, December 7 2018. URL https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/12/07/1874873/ronald-dela-rosa-death-police-found-guilty-murder. Accessed September 3, 2024. 13, 15

Vilalta, Carlos. Violence in Latin America: An overview of research and issues. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 46(1):693–706, 2020. 14, 15

Visconti, Giancarlo. Policy preferences after crime victimization: Panel and survey evidence from Latin America. *British Journal of Political Science*, 50(4):1481–1495, 2020. doi: 10.1017/S0007123418000297. 2, 6

Wee, Sui-Lee and Camille Elemia. Years later, Philippines reckons with Duterte's brutal drug war, June 29, 2024. URL https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/29/world/asia/philippines-drug-war-duterte-justice.html. Accessed September 1, 2024. 7

Whaley, Floyd. Rodrigo Duterte's talk of killing criminals raises fears in Philippines, May 18, 2016. URL https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines.html. Accessed February 10, 2024. 1, 14

Zizumbo-Colunga, Daniel. Community, authorities, and support for vigilantism: Experimental evidence. *Political Behavior*, 39(4):989–1015, 2017. doi: 10.1007/s11109-017-9388-6. URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9388-6. 9

Supporting Information for:

"The Endurance and Erosion of Support for Mano Dura: Electoral Evidence from the War on Drugs in the Philippines"

Table of Contents

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by Region

Region	*Descriptive Statistics*									
	State *Mano Dura* Per 1,000		Militia *Mano Dura* Per 1,000		Targeted Crimes Per 1,000		Nontargeted Crimes Per 1,000		Administration Vote Share	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
ARMM/BARMM	0.019	0.059	0.000	0.005	1.397	2.700	1.089	2.825	0.222	0.204
CAR	0.005	0.020	0.016	0.041	0.699	0.623	2.594	3.385	0.308	0.149
NCR	0.188	0.141	0.143	0.032	5.872	2.102	6.107	2.398	0.404	0.132
REGION I	0.017	0.046	0.050	0.065	1.402	0.694	2.604	2.031	0.326	0.172
REGION II	0.022	0.040	0.054	0.075	1.808	1.070	2.460	2.317	0.314	0.143
REGION III	0.097	0.183	0.037	0.061	2.741	1.387	2.377	1.513	0.337	0.130
REGION IV-A	0.051	0.063	0.020	0.031	3.141	1.796	2.072	1.396	0.312	0.136
REGION IV-B	0.006	0.018	0.000	0.003	1.284	0.924	1.732	1.339	0.273	0.118
REGION IX	0.014	0.033	0.004	0.018	1.694	0.873	3.818	3.216	0.293	0.131
REGION V	0.025	0.039	0.010	0.025	1.251	0.906	5.138	5.356	0.207	0.103
REGION VI	0.011	0.029	0.006	0.015	1.419	0.571	6.568	6.124	0.252	0.120
REGION VII	0.032	0.071	0.019	0.041	2.091	1.567	6.120	4.665	0.291	0.138
REGION VIII	0.005	0.017	0.002	0.011	1.044	1.033	1.945	1.556	0.267	0.124
REGION X	0.017	0.039	0.002	0.012	2.234	1.284	6.274	6.116	0.333	0.180
REGION XI	0.008	0.024	0.003	0.010	1.841	1.586	3.757	3.717	0.364	0.162
REGION XII	0.038	0.076	0.006	0.015	2.138	0.832	5.235	4.142	0.365	0.142
REGION XIII	0.009	0.025	0.007	0.019	1.825	0.710	2.622	1.633	0.317	0.140
Sample Size: 38,736										

A.2 Robustness Checks

Table A.2: Electoral Effects of Targeted and Nontargeted Crimes, Police and Militia *Mano Dura* on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates (Candidates with Over 1 Million Votes)

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.062***
	(0.021)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.141***
	(0.033)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.011***
	(0.001)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001
	(0.001)
Observations	56,490
Adjusted R^2	0.722

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.3: Electoral Effects of Targeted and Nontargeted Crimes, Police and Militia *Mano Dura* on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates (All 62 Senatorial Candidates)

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.022
	(0.020)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.193***
	(0.033)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.013***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.00002
	(0.001)
Observations	100,068
Adjusted R^2	0.796

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.4: Electoral Effects of Targeted and Nontargeted Crimes, Police and Militia *Mano Dura* on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share	
	Top 24 candidates	>1 million votes
Endorsed drug war x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.159***	-0.118***
	(0.042)	(0.028)
Endorsed drug war x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.075	0.040
	(0.052)	(0.036)
Endorsed drug war x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.002	0.0001
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Endorsed drug war x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	38,736	56,490
Adjusted R^2	0.646	0.721

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.5: Electoral Effects of Crime and *Mano Dura* on Total Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates per Locality

	Dependent variable:
	Total administration candidates vote share
Police *mano dura* per 1,000	−0.087***
	(0.034)
Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	−0.061
	(0.058)
Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.002
	(0.002)
Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	−0.003***
	(0.001)
Constant	$0.661^{***}_{(0.004)}$
Observations	1,614
Adjusted R^2	0.020

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.6: Electoral Effects Excluding ALEJANO, GARY (LP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.096***
	(0.027)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.030
	(0.040)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.642

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.7: Electoral Effects Excluding ANGARA, EDGARDO SONNY (LDP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.089***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.004
	(0.038)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.006***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.636

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.8: Electoral Effects Excluding AQUINO, BENIGNO BAM (LP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.099***
	(0.027)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	*0.072
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	**
	-0.002
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.650

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.9: Electoral Effects Excluding BINAY, NANCY (UNA) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.079***
	(0.024)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.007
	(0.035)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	***
	0.007
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	*
	(0.001) -0.001
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.659

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.10: Electoral Effects Excluding BONG REVILLA, RAMON JR (LAKAS) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.097***
	(0.027)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.024
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.006***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.640

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.11: Electoral Effects Excluding CAYETANO, PIA (NP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.083***
	(0.027)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.038
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001*
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.649

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.12: Electoral Effects Excluding COLMENARES, NERI (MKBYN) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.087***
	(0.025)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.051
	(0.036)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.653

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.13: Electoral Effects Excluding DELA ROSA, BATO (PDPLBN) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.092***
	(0.027)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.018
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.630

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.14: Electoral Effects Excluding DIOKNO, CHEL (LP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.098***
	(0.028)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.030
	(0.040)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.646

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.15: Electoral Effects Excluding EJERCITO, ESTRADA JV (NPC) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.085***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.012
	(0.038)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Non-targeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.637

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.16: Electoral Effects Excluding ENRILE, JUAN PONCE (PMP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.084***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.034
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.647

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.17: Electoral Effects Excluding ESTRADA, JINGGOY (PMP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.109***
	(0.029)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.043
	(0.041)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.636

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.18: Electoral Effects Excluding GO, BONG GO (PDPLBN) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.094***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.052
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.648

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.19: Electoral Effects Excluding LAPID, LITO (NPC) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.085***
	(0.024)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.049
	(0.036)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.649

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.20: Electoral Effects Excluding MANGUDADATU, DONG (PDPLBN) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.110***
	(0.028)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.046
	(0.040)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001*
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.634

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.21: Electoral Effects Excluding MANICAD, JIGGY (IND) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.094***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.081**
	(0.038)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.668

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.22: Electoral Effects Excluding MARCOS, IMEE (NP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.080***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.034
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.634

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.23: Electoral Effects Excluding ONG, DOC WILLIE (LAKAS) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.070***
	(0.024)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.085**
	(0.034)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.673

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.24: Electoral Effects Excluding OSMENA, SERGE (IND) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.091***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.058
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.650

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.25: Electoral Effects Excluding PIMENTEL, KOKO (PDPLBN) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.089***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.032
	(0.039)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.008***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001*
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.642

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.26: Electoral Effects Excluding POE, GRACE (IND) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.094***
	(0.025)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.010
	(0.036)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.006***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.001*
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.657

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.27: Electoral Effects Excluding ROXAS, MAR (LP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.087***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.072*
	(0.038)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.009***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.637

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.28: Electoral Effects Excluding TOLENTINO, FRANCIS (PDPLBN) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.095***
	(0.028)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.015
	(0.040)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.607

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Table A.29: Electoral Effects Excluding VILLAR, CYNTHIA (NP) on Voter Share of Pro-*Mano Dura* Candidates

	Dependent variable: Vote share
	Model 1
Administration candidate x Police *mano dura* per 1,000	-0.090***
	(0.026)
Administration candidate x Militia *mano dura* per 1,000	0.049
	(0.038)
Administration candidate x Targeted crimes per 1,000	0.007***
	(0.002)
Administration candidate x Nontargeted crimes per 1,000	-0.002**
	(0.001)
Observations	37,122
Adjusted R^2	0.650

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*