The Education of Donald J. Trump: Reflections on Two Peace Summits

President Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin was hailed by Moscow as a breakthrough for ending its international isolation, praised by Republicans as a prelude to peace in Ukraine, and condemned by critics who feared it would embolden the Kremlin and force Kyiv into concessions with no safeguards against renewed aggression.

Each view has merit, but all miss a crucial point. The meetings in Anchorage and Washington must be judged not against an idealized hypothetical, but against the reality of what would likely have happened without them. That judgement requires some background on Russia’s aims, Ukraine’s resistance, and Trump’s worldview.

Russia’s Aims, Ukrainian Resistance

Russia has wanted to reclaim Soviet territories since losing them in 1991. Even under its first post-Soviet leader Boris Yeltsin, Moscow never accepted Ukraine’s independence within its 1991 borders. Russia’s parliament, the Duma, declared Crimea’s transfer illegal as early as 1992, long before Putin denied outright the existence of a Ukrainian nation. Under Putin, the Kremlin’s consistent goal has been the dismemberment and subjugation of Ukraine: annexing the east and south, installing a pliant regime in Kyiv, and erasing Ukrainian identity through repression and violence.

Ukraine’s objective has been equally consistent: survive as an independent state. Ukrainians have long been divided over orientation toward East or West, but nevertheless agreed that they would not be absorbed by Russia. When President Viktor Yanukovych turned toward Moscow and unleashed violence on protesters in 2014, the backlash toppled him. Amid the chaos, Russia seized Crimea and launched the Donbas insurgency. Ukrainian forces nearly retook it before Russian troops intervened, leaving the region in stalemate.

For eight years, Putin tried to force Kyiv into concessions while the West pressed for “dialogue.” Ukraine contained the conflict instead, and by 2019, it was largely frozen. When Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected president on hopes of accommodation, Moscow still demanded regime change and legal subordination. By 2021, with pro-Russian parties suppressed and Ukrainian identity hardened, Putin concluded that indirect methods had failed and launched the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

For Ukraine, the war is existential. Any territorial concessions would abandon millions to genocidal occupation. Any ceasefire must guarantee the right to arm, ally, and defend against the next Russian invasion. These constitute Kyiv’s irreducible minimum demands.

The War According to Trump

Trump reentered office convinced the war would never have happened under him. From his perspective, it was driven by NATO expansion and Zelenskyy’s obstinacy, aided by President Biden and warmongering Europeans. He treated territory like real estate: whoever controlled Crimea or the Donbas mattered less than ending a deadly conflict over pieces of land.

This outlook dovetailed with Biden’s flawed messaging. Washington boasted of massive aid, though most of that spending stayed in the United States and weapons systems were slow walked to Ukraine. When Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive faltered, it reinforced the impression that the war was unwinnable despite “unprecedented” U.S. support. To Trump, it looked like a sinkhole for American resources, propped up by stubborn Ukrainians and incompetent European allies.

This explains Trump’s opening gambit to end the war: cut off aid, press Zelenskyy into concessions, and let Putin settle for less than his maximalist goals. What Trump discovered, however, was that neither Ukraine nor Russia would play ball.

Lessons Under Pressure

Trump’s pressure revealed Ukraine’s limits. Zelenskyy abandoned rhetoric about 1991 borders, lifted his ban on talks with Putin, and accepted discussion of a ceasefire that would freeze the conflict along the current line of control and accept Russia’s de facto occupation of 20 percent of Ukraine. Yet Ukrainians—backed by overwhelming public opinion—remained ready to fight on even without U.S. support.

Europe, meanwhile, panicked and stepped up. German rearmament accelerated, aid commitments rose, and Europe began buying U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Trump’s pressure delivered what Washington had long demanded: Europeans assuming more of the burden.

But Russia’s response was even more telling. Far from seizing the opportunity, Putin rejected the terms as inadequate. Freezing the lines without Ukrainian disarmament or Western disengagement would lock in failure, not victory. The imperial project required more: regime change and the full subjugation of Ukraine.

The Alaska Summit

With sanctions looming, Putin came to Alaska hoping to forestall economic collapse, widen the rift between Trump and Europe, and project strength. But when he demanded all of Donetsk, Trump—reportedly angered—refused, noting that the United States would not back such terms.

That refusal mattered. For the first time, Trump confronted the reality that Russia’s supposedly reasonable deal was nothing more than the 2022 Istanbul terms recycled: surrender of territory, disarmament, and a veto on Ukraine’s sovereignty. The fantasy of a quick peace evaporated.

The Washington Meeting

Europe and Ukraine seized the moment. Arriving in Washington together, they offered not surrender but partnership: Europe would bear most of the defense burden, Ukraine would buy U.S. arms and even export drones in return. Trump, instead of pressing for Donbas concessions, joined them in calling Putin to propose talks. Moscow stalled.

The meetings revealed a new alignment: Ukraine and Europe stood firm, while Russia showed its maximalism. Trump, seeing the gulf, began to adjust. His Truth Social post comparing Ukraine’s predicament to a team “not allowed to play offense” was a sharp break from Biden’s restrictions and signaled sympathy for Ukrainian strikes inside Russia.

What’s Next

The education of Donald J. Trump is not yet complete, but the trajectory is clear. He entered office believing Ukraine’s resistance was irrational and Russian goals negotiable. He has learned that Ukraine cannot be coerced into capitulation, Europe will not let Ukraine fall, and Russia’s demands remain absolute.

Talk of a “reverse Nixon”—rapprochement with Russia in order to isolate China—is misguided: China and Russia are bound by shared aims to challenge the existing global order, and no U.S. concessions in Europe will break that axis. The only realistic path to counter them is to deepen transatlantic partnership, with Europeans carrying more of the defense load while the United States remains engaged.

Substantive talks on Ukraine’s security guarantees are now underway, with proposals for NATO-like commitments outside of formal membership. If realized, they could transform the war from a desperate defense into a sustainable deterrent against future aggression.

The Alaska and Washington meetings clarified the stakes. The chasm between Russian demands and Ukrainian survival is unbridgeable. Trump, once convinced of quick deals, now confronts that reality. That is the education of Donald J. Trump.

Branislav Slantchev is a professor of political science at UC San Diego.

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